Nov 2, 2010
Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of Transportation
GR L-59234, 30 September 1982
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in the result
FACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT.
ISSUES: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
HELD: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in the result
FACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT.
ISSUES: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.
HELD: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed.
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez
GR 78164, 31 July 1987
En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur
En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur
FACTS: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.
HELD: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.” The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Suico, Secretary of Agrarian Reform
GR 78164, 31 July 1987
En Banc, Cruz (J): 14 concur
FACTS: The petitioners invoked the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands, occupied by tenants who are cultivating such lands, do not exceed the statutory limit. But P.D. No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer shall be ejected until it shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim that the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules; hence, they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. In his Comment, the public respondent argued that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares. Besides, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued. For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of the Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
HELD: The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
En Banc, Cruz (J): 14 concur
FACTS: The petitioners invoked the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands, occupied by tenants who are cultivating such lands, do not exceed the statutory limit. But P.D. No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer shall be ejected until it shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim that the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules; hence, they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. In his Comment, the public respondent argued that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares. Besides, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued. For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of the Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
HELD: The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
The Court observed that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time. But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1976.
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only.
In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court held that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree. Hence, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. The petition was dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.
G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991
Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur
FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur
FACTS: Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
HELD: The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
Lutz vs. Araneta
G.R. No. L-7859, 22 December 1955
En Banc, Reyes J.B. L (J), 8 concur
FACTS: Due to the threat to industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market"; the National Assembly promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes." Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma challenged the legality of the taxes imposed by the said Act. In plaintiff's opinion such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.
HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in the said Act is a pure exercise of the taxing power. However, the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power. That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
En Banc, Reyes J.B. L (J), 8 concur
FACTS: Due to the threat to industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market"; the National Assembly promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes." Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma challenged the legality of the taxes imposed by the said Act. In plaintiff's opinion such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.
HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in the said Act is a pure exercise of the taxing power. However, the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power. That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Lozano vs. Martinez
GR L-63419, 18 December 1986
En Banc, Yap (J): 9 concur
En Banc, Yap (J): 9 concur
FACTS: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812-13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief.
ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act.
HELD: Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily on the offending statute.
Ichong vs. Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957
En Banc, Labrador (J), 8 concur
FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." The main provisions of the Act, among others, are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; and (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist; (2) Whether the law was enacted in interest of national economic survival and security; (3) Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws and the due process of law?; (4) Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?; (5) Whether there was a defect in the title of the law; (6) Whether there was a violation of international treaties and obligations.
HELD: The Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected. Lastly, it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Hence, the petition was denied, with costs against petitioner.
En Banc, Labrador (J), 8 concur
FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." The main provisions of the Act, among others, are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; and (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist; (2) Whether the law was enacted in interest of national economic survival and security; (3) Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws and the due process of law?; (4) Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?; (5) Whether there was a defect in the title of the law; (6) Whether there was a violation of international treaties and obligations.
HELD: The Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected. Lastly, it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Hence, the petition was denied, with costs against petitioner.
Bautista vs. Juinio
GR L-50908, 31 January 1984
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 7 concur, 2 took no part
FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.
HELD: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' "
In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not ignored, much less infringed. Furthermore, in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' "
Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta).
Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. The Memorandum Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law.
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 7 concur, 2 took no part
FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.
HELD: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' "
In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not ignored, much less infringed. Furthermore, in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' "
Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta).
Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. The Memorandum Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law.
Avelino vs. Cuenco
GR L-2821, 4 March 1949
FACTS: Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.
ISSUES:
FACTS: Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president.
HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
Marcos vs. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
FACTS: In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic. This, did not however, stop bloody challenges to the government. The armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Marcos. The woes of the government are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated.
FACTS: In 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic. This, did not however, stop bloody challenges to the government. The armed threats to the government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Marcos. The woes of the government are not purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines
(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return
HELD: Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return
HELD: Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is a power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order.
Another question to determine is whether or no there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, and the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two bidders participated. Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, petitioner matches the bid price of P44.00 per share by Renong Berhad. Subsequently, petitioner sent a manager's check as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated which Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be preferred after it has match the bid offered of Malaysian firm under Section 10, second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." It means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When the Constitution speaks of "national patrimony", it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine Heritage. While it was restrictively an American Hotel when it first opened, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. Respondents further argue that the Constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. Without doubt, the transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two bidders participated. Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, petitioner matches the bid price of P44.00 per share by Renong Berhad. Subsequently, petitioner sent a manager's check as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated which Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be preferred after it has match the bid offered of Malaysian firm under Section 10, second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." It means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. When the Constitution speaks of "national patrimony", it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine Heritage. While it was restrictively an American Hotel when it first opened, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. Respondents further argue that the Constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. Without doubt, the transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to accept the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
Nov 1, 2010
PLDT vs. NTC
GR 88404, 18 October 1990; En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J)
FACTS: On 22 June 1958, RA 2090 was enacted granting Felix Alberto & Co. (later ETCI) a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications. On 13 May 1987, ETCI filed an application with the NTC for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to operate, etc. a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss. On 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDT’s opposition and declared RA 2090 should be liberally construed so as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service as part of services of the franchise. On 12 December 1988, NTC granted ETCI provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service initially in Metro Manila subject to the terms and conditions set forth in its order, including an interconnection agreement to be entered with PLDT. PLDT filed a motion to set aside order which was denied by the NTC on 8 May 1989. PLDT challenged the 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 NTC orders before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the provisional authority was properly granted.
(2) Whether ETCI’s franchise includes operation of cellular mobile telephone system (CMTS)
(3) Whether PLDT can refuse interconnection with ETCI.
RULING:
(1) The provisional authority granted by the NTC (which is the regulatory agency of the National Government over all telecommunications entities) has a definite expiry period of 18 months unless sooner renewed; may be revoked, amended or revised by the NTC; covers one of four phases; limited to Metro Manila only; and does not authorize the installation and operation of an alphanumeric paging system. It was further issued after due hearing, with PLDT attending and granted after a prima facie showing that ETCI had the necessary legal, financial and technical capabilities; and that public interest, convenience and necessity so demanded. Provisional authority would be meaningless if the grantee were not allowed to operate, as its lifetime is limited and may be revoked by the NTC at any time in accordance with law.
(2) The NTC construed the technical term “radiotelephony” liberally as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. The construction given by an administrative agency possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and experience and deserves great weight and respect. It can only be set aside by judicial intervention on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
(3) The NTC merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of telecommunication networks when it decreed interconnection. PLDT cannot refuse interconnection as such is mandated under RA 6949 or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989. What interconnection seeks to accomplish is to enable the system to reach out to the greatest number of people possible in line with governmental policies. With the broader reach, public interest and convenience will be better served. Public need, public interest, and the common good are the decisive, if not the ultimate, considerations. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must yield.
The NTC order does not deprive PLDT due process as it allows the parties themselves to discuss and agree upon the specific terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement instead of the NTC itself laying down the standards of interconnection which it can very well impose.
In RE: Garcia
2 SCRA 984
FACTS: Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes” for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as “Licenciado en derecho”. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar
RULING: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
FACTS: Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes” for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as “Licenciado en derecho”. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar
RULING: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova
9 SCRA 230
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents “are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,” because Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the “Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.”
ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.
HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question.” In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
Ichong vs. Hernandez
101 PHIL 155
FACTS: The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in our country.
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.
HELD: The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.
Kuroda vs. Jalandoni
83 PHIL 171
FACTS: Petitioner, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces, was charged before a military commission set by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines. Said executive order also established a National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Petitioner contended that E.O. No. 68 was illegal and unconstitutional because he cannot be tried fro violation of international conventions, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Furthermore, he alleged that the participation of two American lawyers in the prosecution was violative of our national sovereignty.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Government has the jurisdiction to try and convict Kuroda for violating prohibited acts of the war.
HELD: Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional because Article II, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution explicitly provides that “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of nation.”
In promulgation and enforcement of E.O. No. 68, the President of the Philippine exercised his power as commander-in-chief of all armed forces. Moreover, it was in adherence with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which form part of our Constitution.
With regards to the contention about the participation of two American lawyers, the Philippines were under the sovereignty of the United States and thus, we were equally bound together with the US and Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty.
Tanada vs. Angara
272 SCRA 18
FACTS: The suit was filed to nullify the concurrence of the Philippines Senate to the President’s Ratification of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. It was contended that the agreement places nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention of the Filipino First Policy.
Petitioners maintained that this Agreement was an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress.
HELD: While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to limitations and restrictions voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines as a member of the family of nations. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties xxx. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutuality covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
Traders Royal Bank vs CA
FACTS: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the respondent CA affirming the nullity of the transfer of central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness (CBC) No. D981, with a face value of P500,000 from Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (Philfinance) to the petitioner Trader’s Royal Bank (TRB)
ISSUE: Whether or not CBCI No D891 is a negotiable instrument
HELD: No. The language of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit instrument is its freedom to circulate as a substitute for money. Hence, freedom negotiability is the touchstone relating to the protection of holders in due course, and the freedom of negotiability is the foundation for the protection which the law throws around a holder in due course.
This freedom in negotiability is totally absent in a certificate of indebtedness as it merely acknowledges paying a sum of money to a specified person or entity for a period of time.
Liang vs. People
GR 125865, 28 January 2000
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
HELD: The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in “official capacity.” The prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
The petition is therefore denied.
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank. Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. MeTC Judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. The MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the case based from the said protocol.
The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
ISSUE: Whether immunity invoked by DFA for ADB employees based on the Agreement is cognizable in our courts.
HELD: The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in “official capacity.” The prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
The petition is therefore denied.
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