Liang vs. People

GR 125865, 28 January 2000

FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank. Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. MeTC Judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. The MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the case based from the said protocol.

The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.

ISSUE: Whether immunity invoked by DFA for ADB employees based on the Agreement is cognizable in our courts.

HELD: The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in “official capacity.” The prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence.
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
The petition is therefore denied.

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh

75 PHIL 131


FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law.

ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government.

Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces.

HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good.

All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign.

Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings.

United States of America vs. Guinto

182 SCRA 644

FACTS: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering services in the said base.

In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners.

In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O’ Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Bas, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.

In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the US), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the US, which had not given its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

HELD: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded.

When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. In the case o US, the customary law of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

It is clear from a study of the records of GR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operations against the complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

As for GR No. 80018, the record is too meager to indicate what really happened. The needed inquiry first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial.

De Leon vs. Esguerra

153 SCRA 602
No. L-78059, August 31, 1987

FACTS: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as Brgy. Captain and other petitioners won as Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under the Barangay Election Act of 1982, their terms of office shall be six years, which commenced on June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb. 8, 1987, while the petitioners still have one year and four months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province, issued a memorandum designating Florentino Magno as the new Brgy. Captain and other respondents as the new Councilmen of the said barrangay. The respondents relied on the Provisional Constitution of 1986, which grants the governor to appoint or designate new successors within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25 1987. They also contended that the terms of office of the petitioners were already been abolished and that they continued in office simply because no new successors were appointed yet; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials up to six years must have been deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution. Petitioners instituted an original action for prohibition to review the order of the governor.

ISSUE: Whether the designation was valid?

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the memoranda issued by Gov. Esguerra has no legal effect. Though the designation was within the one year period which ended on Feb. 25, 1987, however, it was cut short when the 1987 Constitution took effect on Feb. 2, 1987. When the 1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no longer had the authority to designate successors under the Provisional Constitution which was deemed to have been superseded. There has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials; and the Barangay Election Act is not inconsistent with the Constitution. The writ of prohibition was granted and the petitioners have acquired the security of tenure.

Notes:

When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?

- The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled in De leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987 which is the date of its ratification in the plebiscite, by virtue of its provision under Article XVIII, Section 27 that it “shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose.” (This provision was unanimously approved by thirty-five votes in favor and none against in the Con Com of 1986)

- The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification that is the date the people have cast their votes in favor of the Constitution. The act of voting by the people is the act of ratification. It should not be on the date of the proclamation of the President since it is the act of the people. In fact, there should be no need to wait for any proclamation on the part of the President, if there is, it is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act done by the people. The COMELEC, on the other hand, should make the official announcement that the votes show that the Constitution was ratified, but the canvass is merely a mathematical confirmation of what was done during the plebiscite.

Holy See vs. Rosario Jr.

238 SCRA 524

FACTS: A piece of real property was acquired by the Holy See by way of donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The purpose was to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. Later, the Holy See sold the property on condition that it will evict the squatters therein. For failure to comply with the condition, the Holy See was sued. It moved to dismiss on the ground of state immunity.

ISSUE: Whether respondent trial court has jurisdiction over petitioner being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status if a foreign sovereign, the Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine Government since 1957.
The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum and certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The DFA has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country. The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts.

Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s foreign relations.