GR 78164, 31 July 1987
En Banc, Cruz (J): 14 concur
FACTS: The petitioners invoked the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands, occupied by tenants who are cultivating such lands, do not exceed the statutory limit. But P.D. No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer shall be ejected until it shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim that the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules; hence, they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. In his Comment, the public respondent argued that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares. Besides, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued. For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of the Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
HELD: The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
En Banc, Cruz (J): 14 concur
FACTS: The petitioners invoked the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands, occupied by tenants who are cultivating such lands, do not exceed the statutory limit. But P.D. No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer shall be ejected until it shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim that the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules; hence, they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. In his Comment, the public respondent argued that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares. Besides, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued. For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of the Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
HELD: The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
The Court observed that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time. But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1976.
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only.
In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court held that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree. Hence, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. The petition was dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
